base.txt | issue85.txt | |||
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skipping to change at page 2, line 27 | skipping to change at page 2, line 27 | |||
5.1.3 Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | 5.1.3 Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
5.2 Signature Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | 5.2 Signature Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
5.2.1 Processing Rules for Senders . . . . . . . . . . 16 | 5.2.1 Processing Rules for Senders . . . . . . . . . . 16 | |||
5.2.2 Processing Rules for Receivers . . . . . . . . . 17 | 5.2.2 Processing Rules for Receivers . . . . . . . . . 17 | |||
5.2.3 Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 | 5.2.3 Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 | |||
5.2.4 Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | 5.2.4 Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | |||
5.3 Timestamp and Nonce options . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | 5.3 Timestamp and Nonce options . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | |||
5.3.1 Timestamp Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | 5.3.1 Timestamp Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 | |||
5.3.2 Nonce Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | 5.3.2 Nonce Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 | |||
5.3.3 Processing rules for senders . . . . . . . . . . 21 | 5.3.3 Processing rules for senders . . . . . . . . . . 21 | |||
5.3.4 Processing rules for receivers . . . . . . . . . 21 | 5.3.4 Processing rules for receivers . . . . . . . . . 22 | |||
6. Authorization Delegation Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | 6. Authorization Delegation Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | |||
6.1 Certificate Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | 6.1 Certificate Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 | |||
6.1.1 Router Authorization Certificate Profile . . . . 25 | 6.1.1 Router Authorization Certificate Profile . . . . 25 | |||
6.2 Certificate Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | 6.2 Certificate Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 | |||
6.2.1 Delegation Chain Solicitation Message Format . . 28 | 6.2.1 Delegation Chain Solicitation Message Format . . 28 | |||
6.2.2 Delegation Chain Advertisement Message Format . 30 | 6.2.2 Delegation Chain Advertisement Message Format . 30 | |||
6.2.3 Trust Anchor Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 | 6.2.3 Trust Anchor Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 | |||
6.2.4 Certificate Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 | 6.2.4 Certificate Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 | |||
6.2.5 Processing Rules for Routers . . . . . . . . . . 35 | 6.2.5 Processing Rules for Routers . . . . . . . . . . 35 | |||
6.2.6 Processing Rules for Hosts . . . . . . . . . . . 36 | 6.2.6 Processing Rules for Hosts . . . . . . . . . . . 36 | |||
skipping to change at page 13, line 31 | skipping to change at page 13, line 31 | |||
option MUST be treated as insecure, i.e., processed in the same way | option MUST be treated as insecure, i.e., processed in the same way | |||
as NDP messages sent by a non-SEND node. The processing of insecure | as NDP messages sent by a non-SEND node. The processing of insecure | |||
messages is specified in Section 8. Note that SEND nodes that do not | messages is specified in Section 8. Note that SEND nodes that do not | |||
attempt to interoperate with non-SEND nodes MAY simply discard the | attempt to interoperate with non-SEND nodes MAY simply discard the | |||
insecure messages. | insecure messages. | |||
Router Solicitation messages without the CGA option MUST be also | Router Solicitation messages without the CGA option MUST be also | |||
treated as insecure, unless the source address of the message is the | treated as insecure, unless the source address of the message is the | |||
unspecified address. | unspecified address. | |||
A message containing a CGA option MUST be checked as follows: | Redirect, Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router | |||
Solicitation, and Router Advertisement messages containing a CGA | ||||
option MUST be checked as follows: | ||||
If the interface has been configured to use CGA, the receiving | If the interface has been configured to use CGA, the receiving | |||
node MUST verify the source address of the packet using the | node MUST verify the source address of the packet using the | |||
algorithm described in Section 5 of [13]. The inputs to the | algorithm described in Section 5 of [13]. The inputs to the | |||
algorithm are the claimed address, as defined in the previous | algorithm are the claimed address, as defined in the previous | |||
section, and the CGA Parameters field. | section, and the CGA Parameters field. | |||
If the CGA verification is successful, the recipient proceeds with | If the CGA verification is successful, the recipient proceeds with | |||
the cryptographically more time consuming check of the signature. | the cryptographically more time consuming check of the signature. | |||
However, even if the CGA verification succeeds, no claims about | However, even if the CGA verification succeeds, no claims about | |||
skipping to change at page 17, line 24 | skipping to change at page 17, line 24 | |||
Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Advertisement, | Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Advertisement, | |||
and Redirect messages without the Signature option MUST be treated as | and Redirect messages without the Signature option MUST be treated as | |||
insecure, i.e., processed in the same way as NDP messages sent by a | insecure, i.e., processed in the same way as NDP messages sent by a | |||
non-SEND node. See Section 8. | non-SEND node. See Section 8. | |||
Router Solicitation messages without the Signature option MUST be | Router Solicitation messages without the Signature option MUST be | |||
also treated as insecure, unless the source address of the message is | also treated as insecure, unless the source address of the message is | |||
the unspecified address. | the unspecified address. | |||
A message containing a Signature option MUST be checked as follows: | Redirect, Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router | |||
Solicitation, and Router Advertisement messages containing a | ||||
Signature option MUST be checked as follows: | ||||
o The receiver MUST ignore any options the come after the first | o The receiver MUST ignore any options the come after the first | |||
Signature option. (The options are ignored for both signature | Signature option. (The options are ignored for both signature | |||
verification and NDP processing purposes.) | verification and NDP processing purposes.) | |||
o The Key Hash field MUST indicate the use of a known public key, | o The Key Hash field MUST indicate the use of a known public key, | |||
either one learned from a preceding CGA option in the same | either one learned from a preceding CGA option in the same | |||
message, or one known by other means. | message, or one known by other means. | |||
o The Digital Signature field MUST have correct encoding, and not | o The Digital Signature field MUST have correct encoding, and not | |||
skipping to change at page 17, line 49 | skipping to change at page 18, line 3 | |||
o If the use of a trust anchor has been configured, a valid | o If the use of a trust anchor has been configured, a valid | |||
authorization delegation chain MUST be known between the | authorization delegation chain MUST be known between the | |||
receiver's trust anchor and the sender's public key. | receiver's trust anchor and the sender's public key. | |||
Note that the receiver may verify just the CGA property of a | Note that the receiver may verify just the CGA property of a | |||
packet, even if, in addition to CGA, the sender has used a trust | packet, even if, in addition to CGA, the sender has used a trust | |||
anchor. | anchor. | |||
Messages that do not pass all the above tests MUST be silently | Messages that do not pass all the above tests MUST be silently | |||
discarded. The receiver MAY also otherwise silently discard packets, | discarded if the host has been configured to only accept secure ND | |||
e.g., as a response to an apparent CPU exhausting DoS attack. | messages. The messages MAY be accepted it the host has been | |||
configured to accept both secure and insecure messages, but MUST be | ||||
treated as an insecure message. The receiver MAY also otherwise | ||||
silently discard packets, e.g., as a response to an apparent CPU | ||||
exhausting DoS attack. | ||||
5.2.3 Configuration | 5.2.3 Configuration | |||
All nodes that support the reception of the Signature options MUST be | All nodes that support the reception of the Signature options MUST be | |||
configured with the following information for each separate NDP | configured with the following information for each separate NDP | |||
message type: | message type: | |||
authorization method | authorization method | |||
This parameter determines the method through which the authority | This parameter determines the method through which the authority | |||
End of changes. | ||||
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