base.txt   issue78.txt 
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network operators may want to run a particular link with a mixture of network operators may want to run a particular link with a mixture of
secure and insecure nodes. Nodes that support SEND SHOULD support secure and insecure nodes. Nodes that support SEND SHOULD support
the use of SEND and plain NDP at the same time. the use of SEND and plain NDP at the same time.
In a mixed environment, SEND nodes receive both secure and insecure In a mixed environment, SEND nodes receive both secure and insecure
messages but give priority to "secured" ones. Here, the "secured" messages but give priority to "secured" ones. Here, the "secured"
messages are ones that contain a valid signature option, as specified messages are ones that contain a valid signature option, as specified
above, and "insecure" messages are ones that contain no signature above, and "insecure" messages are ones that contain no signature
option. option.
A SEND node SHOULD have a configuration option that causes it to
ignore all insecure Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement, Router
Solicitation and Advertisement, and Redirect messages. This can be
used to enforce SEND-only networks. The default for this
configuration option SHOULD be that both secure and insecure messages
are allowed.
SEND nodes MUST send only secured messages. Plain (non-SEND) SEND nodes MUST send only secured messages. Plain (non-SEND)
Neighbor Discovery nodes will obviously send only insecure messages. Neighbor Discovery nodes will obviously send only insecure messages.
Per RFC 2461 [7], such nodes will ignore the unknown options and will Per RFC 2461 [7], such nodes will ignore the unknown options and will
treat secured messages in the same way as they treat insecure ones. treat secured messages in the same way as they treat insecure ones.
Secured and insecure nodes share the same network resources, such as Secured and insecure nodes share the same network resources, such as
prefixes and address spaces. prefixes and address spaces.
In a mixed environment SEND nodes follow the protocols defined in RFC In a mixed environment SEND nodes follow the protocols defined in RFC
2461 and RFC 2462 with the following exceptions: 2461 and RFC 2462 with the following exceptions:
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verification, CRL checks, and RA signature checks. A node MAY also verification, CRL checks, and RA signature checks. A node MAY also
adopt an insecure router if a SEND router becomes unreachable, but adopt an insecure router if a SEND router becomes unreachable, but
SHOULD attempt to find a SEND router as soon as possible, since SHOULD attempt to find a SEND router as soon as possible, since
the unreachability may be the result of an attack. Note that while the unreachability may be the result of an attack. Note that while
this can speed up attachment to a new network, accepting an this can speed up attachment to a new network, accepting an
insecure router opens the node to possible attacks, and nodes that insecure router opens the node to possible attacks, and nodes that
choose to accept insecure routers do so at their own risk. The choose to accept insecure routers do so at their own risk. The
node SHOULD in any case prefer the SEND router as soon as one is node SHOULD in any case prefer the SEND router as soon as one is
available with completed security checks. available with completed security checks.
o A SEND node SHOULD have a configuration option that causes it to
ignore all insecure Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement,
Router Solicitation and Advertisement, and Redirect messages. This
can be used to enforce SEND-only networks.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
9.1 Threats to the Local Link Not Covered by SEND 9.1 Threats to the Local Link Not Covered by SEND
SEND does not provide confidentiality for NDP communications. SEND does not provide confidentiality for NDP communications.
SEND does not compensate for an insecure link layer. For instance, SEND does not compensate for an insecure link layer. For instance,
there is no assurance that payload packets actually come from the there is no assurance that payload packets actually come from the
same peer that the NDP was run against. same peer that the NDP was run against.
 End of changes. 

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