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6. Authorization Delegation Discovery | 6. Authorization Delegation Discovery | |
Several protocols, including the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol, | Several protocols, including the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol, | |
allow a node to automatically configure itself based on information | allow a node to automatically configure itself based on information | |
it learns shortly after connecting to a new link. It is particularly | it learns shortly after connecting to a new link. It is particularly | |
easy to configure "rogue" routers on an unsecured link, and it is | easy to configure "rogue" routers on an unsecured link, and it is | |
particularly difficult for a node to distinguish between valid and | particularly difficult for a node to distinguish between valid and | |
invalid sources of information, when the node needs this information | invalid sources of information, when the node needs this information | |
before being able to communicate with nodes outside of the link. | before being able to communicate with nodes outside of the link. | |
Since the newly-connected node cannot communicate off-link, it can | Since the newly-connected node cannot communicate off-link, it cannot | |
not be responsible for searching information to help validating the | be responsible for searching information to help validating the | |
router(s); however, given a chain of appropriately signed | router(s); however, given a chain of appropriately signed | |
certificates, it can check someone else's search results and conclude | certificates, it can check someone else's search results and conclude | |
that a particular message comes from an authorized source. In the | that a particular message comes from an authorized source. In the | |
typical case, a router, which is already connected to beyond the | typical case, a router, which is already connected to beyond the | |
link, can (if necessary) communicate with off-link nodes and | link, can (if necessary) communicate with off-link nodes and | |
construct such a certificate chain. | construct such a certificate chain. | |
The Secure Neighbor Discovery Protocol mandates a certificate format | The Secure Neighbor Discovery Protocol mandates a certificate format | |
and introduces two new ICMPv6 messages that are used between hosts | and introduces two new ICMPv6 messages that are used between hosts | |
and routers to allow the host to learn a certificate chain with the | and routers to allow the host to learn a certificate chain with the | |
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communications. | communications. | |
There may be no cryptographic binding in SEND between the link layer | There may be no cryptographic binding in SEND between the link layer | |
frame address and the IPv6 address. On an insecure link layer that | frame address and the IPv6 address. On an insecure link layer that | |
allows nodes to spoof the link layer address of other nodes, an | allows nodes to spoof the link layer address of other nodes, an | |
attacker could disrupt IP service by sending out a Neighbor | attacker could disrupt IP service by sending out a Neighbor | |
Advertisement having the source address on the link layer frame of a | Advertisement having the source address on the link layer frame of a | |
victim, a valid CGA address and a valid signature corresponding to | victim, a valid CGA address and a valid signature corresponding to | |
itself, and a Target Link-layer Address extension corresponding to | itself, and a Target Link-layer Address extension corresponding to | |
the victim. The attacker could then proceed to cause a traffic | the victim. The attacker could then proceed to cause a traffic | |
stream to bombard the victim in a DoS attack. To protect against | stream to bombard the victim in a DoS attack. This attack cannot be | |
such attacks, link layer security SHOULD be used. | prevented just by securing the link layer alone. | |
Even on a secure link layer, SEND does not require that the addresses | Even on a secure link layer, SEND does not require that the addresses | |
on the link layer and Neighbor Advertisements correspond to each | on the link layer and Neighbor Advertisements correspond to each | |
other. However, it is RECOMMENDED that such checks be performed | other. However, it is RECOMMENDED that such checks be performed | |
where this is possible on the given link layer technology. | where this is possible on the given link layer technology. | |
Prior to participating in Neighbor Discovery and Duplicate Address | Prior to participating in Neighbor Discovery and Duplicate Address | |
Detection, nodes must subscribe to the link-scoped All-Nodes | Detection, nodes must subscribe to the link-scoped All-Nodes | |
Multicast Group and the Solicited-Node Multicast Group for the | Multicast Group and the Solicited-Node Multicast Group for the | |
address that they are claiming for their addresses; RFC 2461 [7]. | address that they are claiming for their addresses; RFC 2461 [7]. | |
End of changes. | ||
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